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Abstract 
 
This essay addresses the implications of accounting and hybrids for the management 
of risk. It suggests that the management of organizations is rapidly being transformed 
into and formalized around the management of risk, while much of the real 
management of risks occurs elsewhere. We argue firstly and most generally that 
hybrids in all their varied forms are one of the key sites where uncertainty is managed 
beyond the formalized practices of risk management. Secondly, we argue that the 
management literature on hybrids has been too focused on organizational forms, and 
has neglected the hybrid practices, processes and expertises that make possible lateral 
information flows and cooperation across the boundaries of organizations and firms.  
Thirdly, we argue that accounting practices are central to these issues, yet these 
practices are often neglected by the wider management and organizational literatures.  
Accounting, we suggest, is constantly engaged in a dual hybridization process: 
seeking to make visible and calculable the hybrids that it encounters, while at the 
same time hybridizing itself through encounters with a range of other disciplines. We 
address these issues in three stages. In the first section, we draw attention to the key 
disciplines that have ‘discovered’ hybrids, albeit at different times and in differing 
ways. In the second section, some selected examples of hybrid practices, processes 
and expertises are identified and briefly discussed. In the third section, and in 
conclusion, the implications of accounting and hybrids for the management of risk are 
considered. 
                                                 
1 Peter Miller and Liisa Kurunmäki are at London School of Economics and Political Science, and Ted 
O’Leary is at University of Manchester and University of Michigan (Ann Arbor).  
We would like to thank participants at the conference on ‘Sustaining organizational combinations: the 
forms and features of management control in hybrid relationships’, held at the University of Bocconi, 
Italy, September 2005. We would also like to thank Mike Power for his comments on an early version 
of this essay, together with colleagues at LSE in the Accounting Group, and in the Centre for Analysis 
of Risk and Regulation. 
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Introduction 
 
The management of organizations is rapidly being transformed into and formalized 
around the management of risk, while much of the real management of risks occurs 
elsewhere. From COSO and Cadbury, through Turnbull and more recently Sarbanes-
Oxley, regulatory pressures implicitly treat isomorphism as a desirable end in itself.2  
It seems as if almost anything today can be defined as a potential risk, and managed in 
accordance with newly established regulatory norms.3 In a short space of time, risk 
committees, risk officers and risk maps have become obligatory elements of 
formalized governance mechanisms, and accorded their appropriate place in 
managerial hierarchies. Faith in the manageability of risks appears to go hand in hand 
with a growing ‘risk appetite’ on the part of organizations, as the category of risk is 
itself differentiated and multiplied into operational risk, strategic risk, reputational 
risk and so forth. Risk management as an idea and a routinized set of practices is now 
central to both private sector companies and public sector organizations, and indeed is 
an important boundary-spanning activity that is becoming a model of organization in 
its own right. 
 
Hybrids are similarly ubiquitous, and vary considerably in type. They can take the 
form of organizational arrangements that do not readily fit traditional models of 
hierarchies or markets. Or they can take the form of hybrid processes, practices or 
expertises produced out of two or more elements normally found separately.4 Yet, 
while these two phenomena are already almost taken for granted by researchers and 
practitioners, the implications of hybrids for the management of risk are insufficiently 
addressed. As risk management comes to be defined increasingly as formal process, 
the dynamics of organisational life, the permeability and fuzzy nature of 
organizational boundaries, and the varied hybrid practices through which uncertainty 
is actually managed within and across organizations tend to be confined to the 
penumbra. Standardization and compliance tend to take precedence over the 
management of the real risks that organizations face. And the vocabulary of risk 
management, with its hierarchical emphasis, remains largely antithetical to the hybrid 
nature of an increasing number of organizational and inter-organizational practices. 
 
Firstly and most generally, this essay argues that hybrids in all their varied forms are 
one of the key sites where uncertainty is managed beyond the formalized practices of 
risk management. Management of the actual risks that organizations face does not 
only happen, we argue, through the now obligatory and increasingly complex 
apparatus of risk management systems. Indeed, as compliance with more or less 
standardized governance models comes to dominate increasingly the design of risk 
management systems, it may well be that such systems lose their ability to manage the 
real risks that organizations face. Secondly, we argue that the management literature 
on hybrids has been too focused on organizational forms, and has neglected the hybrid 
practices, processes and expertises that make possible lateral information flows and 
                                                 
2 See: Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992 (Cadbury Report); 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 1992; ICAEW, 1999 
(Turnbull Report); Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
3 See Power (2004) for a review and challenging critique of this aspiration to engage in the ‘risk 
management of everything’. 
4  Hybrids, according to this view, have distinctive attributes and characteristics, and are not merely 
intermediary forms. 
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cooperation across the boundaries of organizations and firms. The diversity of hybrids 
has been given insufficient attention, and we argue that this needs to be redressed if 
we are to understand better how organizations manage the range of risks they face. 
Thirdly, we argue that accounting practices are central to these issues, yet these 
practices are often neglected by the wider management and organizational literatures.  
Historically, accounting is itself a hybrid that was formed at the margins of other 
disciplines such as engineering and economics (Miller, 1998). One might say that 
accounting has always been concerned in large part with managing uncertainty and 
risk, even if the language of risk has only relatively recently entered the accounting 
lexicon. 
 
This suggests an important lesson about hybrids: that the process of hybridization is 
continuing and dynamic, even if its rate varies across time. Whether it is a matter of 
the emergence of new organizational forms, processes, practices or expertises, 
typically the newly formed hybrid stabilizes for a while and may even become 
institutionalized.5 We are seeing this now with formalized risk management and 
governance systems that are specified with increasing detail. Equally typically, the 
process is likely then to recommence as a more or less stabilized and institutionalized 
arrangement is disturbed as it comes into contact with a new set of demands, issues or 
events.6 The roles of accounting in this process are emblematic. For accounting is not 
only itself a hybrid to its core, but it is constantly seeking to make manageable other 
newly formed hybrids. Whether in the form of triple bottom-line reporting, value 
reporting, inter-oganizational cost management, target costing, open book accounting, 
pooled budgets, or whatever, accounting is constantly engaged in a dual hybridization 
process: seeking to make visible and calculable the hybrids that it encounters, while at 
the same time hybridizing itself through encounters with those who claim expertise in 
marketing, strategy, design, medicine and so forth. 
 
This essay addresses these issues in three stages.  In the first section, it draws 
attention to the key disciplines – accounting, economics, law, organisation theory and 
sociology – that have ‘discovered’ hybrids, albeit at different times and in differing 
ways. In the second section, some selected examples of hybrid practices, processes 
and expertises are identified and briefly discussed. In the third section, and in 
conclusion, the implications of hybrids for the management of risk are considered. 
 
 
The Discovery of Hybrids 
 
Without hybridization, accounting would lack much of its core calculative content.  
Management accounting was formed and re-formed largely at the ‘margins’, and out 
of a range of calculative practices drawn from other disciplines such as engineering 
and economics (Miller, 1998).  Practices such as standard costing, discounted cash 
flow, the distinction between fixed and variable costs, break-even analysis, and much 
                                                 
5 To bring together the somewhat distinct language of actor-network theory and institutional theory, 
one might say that, as networks or assemblages come to be stabilized for reasonable periods, they take 
on the characteristics of institutions (Miller, 1997). 
6 This process has similarities to the process of hybridization and purification that Latour (1993) 
describes.  Whereas Latour is concerned primarily with the hybridization of nature and culture, of 
science and society, the concern in this essay is with the hybridization (and stabilization) of 
organizational forms, as well as the hybridization of practices, processes and expertise. 
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more have been drawn from elsewhere and constituted as the core of accounting. If 
we want to understand better the dynamics of hybridization processes, how hybrids 
form out of elements typically found separately, and how they then become stabilized 
and institutionalized before the hybridization process begins anew, accounting offers 
an ideal-typical illustration. Practices that once were at the margins seem now to be 
intrinsic and fundamental to the self-identity of accounting, even as they are 
beginning to be questioned, challenged and re-shaped. Earlier battles and skirmishes 
over the boundaries of accounting are soon effaced from the collective memory, as the 
discipline moves on to worry about a new set of issues regarding the integrity of its 
self-image. 
 
Yet there is another side to the hybridization of accounting – the more or less constant 
attempts on the part of accounting to recognize and account for other hybrids. Even if 
accounting has been relatively slow to achieve this, no doubt due in part to its deep 
commitment to entity assumptions, we now see accounting seeking to catch up with 
the phenomenon of inter-organizational relationships. Nearly a decade ago, Hopwood 
(1996) argued that management processes frequently transcend legal organizational 
boundaries, yet most accounting practices continue to focus on hierarchical 
relationships and information flows. Lateral information flows are typically neglected, 
and budgeting, planning and performance evaluation are largely seen in vertical 
terms. Even the so-called new management accountings tend to maintain this 
hierarchical orientation. To counter this, Hopwood called for greater attention to be 
paid to the lateral processing of information, and for more explicit consideration to be 
accorded to the integration of actions within networks of organizations. In so far as 
planning, budgeting and control processes flow from one organization into others and 
create an interdependence of action, he argued that a more explicit awareness of such 
processes is needed to facilitate the role of joint action in organizational success. 
Building on these arguments, a body of work has begun to form that provides 
substantive empirical analysis of the diverse ways in which accounting adapts to and 
facilitates inter-organizational cooperation. Cost management across organizations, 
supply chains and supplier selection practices, open-book forms of accounting, 
strategic alliances, budgeting, and investment appraisal have all begun to receive 
attention in terms of the lateral information flows they entail, and in terms of the ways 
in which accounting practices today extend beyond the boundaries of organizations 
(Baxter and Chua, 2003; Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Håkansson 
and Lind, 2004; Ittner et al, 1999; Kurunmäki and Miller, 2004; Llewellyn, 1991, 
1994; Miller and O’Leary, 2005b, 2005c; Mouritsen, 1999; Mouritsen, et al., 2001;  
Seal et al, 2004; Tomkins, 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). 
 
If accounting has, until recently, remained largely fixated on the traditional 
hierarchical organization, economics has been similarly focused on the distinction 
between markets and hierarchies, despite the early treatment of ‘hybrids’ by writers 
such as Williamson. Over 25 years ago, Williamson argued that much economic 
activity takes place via governance structures that are intermediate between markets 
and hierarchies (Williamson, 1979).  He argued then that, if it remains interesting to 
ask why so much vertical integration occurs, it is equally interesting to ask why so 
many transactions occur in markets and quasi-markets. While markets and hierarchies 
represent two of the principal governance structures for organizing transactions, 
Williamson argued that a third type that he called ‘semi-specific’ also existed 
(Williamson, 1979: 247). Semi-specific governance structures, he argued, were 
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tailored to transactions that were neither highly standardized nor highly specific.  
Several years later, he commented that transactions in the ‘middle range’ were much 
more common than he had thought a decade earlier (Williamson, 1985: 83).7 By the 
early 1990s, he identified hybrids explicitly as one of three alternative modes of 
governance (Williamson, 1991). The aim here was to put hybrids on a similar footing 
to markets and hierarchies, and to characterize the abstract attributes that define them 
as an alternative mode of governance rather than a loose amalgam of market and 
hierarchy. The firm, Williamson argued, is usefully thought of as the organizational 
form or governance structure ‘of last resort’ (Williamson, 2002: 183), driven largely 
by increasing asset specificity. Hybrids, although representing a distinctive and 
generic mode of governance, are conceived as ‘market-preserving credible contracting 
modes that possess adaptive attributes located between classical markets and 
hierarchies’ (Williamson, 2002: 181). 
 
Similar arguments have been advanced recently by Holmström and Roberts (1998) in 
a paper that re-visits the classic questions in the economics of organizations of why 
firms exist, and what determines their scope. If, as Coase (1937) argued, firm 
boundaries and integration can be explained by efficiency considerations, Holmström 
and Roberts ask why so much economic activity takes place outside the umbrella of 
the organization? While noting the lack of solid theoretical foundations, and the 
anecdotal nature of the evidence, Holmström and Roberts suggest that a much broader 
view of the firm and the determination of its boundaries is needed than is offered by 
transaction cost economics and property rights theory.8 The theory of the firm, they 
argue, has become too narrowly focused on the hold-up problem and the role of asset 
specificity. Citing a trend they discern towards disintegration, outsourcing, 
contracting out, and dealing through the market rather than integration within the 
firm, they argue that firms have to deal with a rich variety of problems. Only a small 
part of the organizational change taking place today, they suggest, can be readily 
understood in terms of traditional transaction cost theory in which hold-up problems 
are resolved by integration. Many of the hybrid organizations that are emerging, they 
argue, are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, frequency of transaction and 
asset specificity, yet they do not result in integration. Indeed, they suggest, mutual 
dependency seems to support rather than hinder ongoing cooperation across firm 
boundaries. This parallels the arguments made by accounting researchers, that new 
hybrid practices are emerging as ways of making manageable and calculable lateral 
and cross-organizational relationships that cannot be readily understood and captured 
by existing modes of accounting. While Holmström and Roberts do not advance a 
specific or singular explanation for the phenomena they identify, it is clear that they 
regard organizational knowledge and information transfer as key. Leading economic 
theories of firm boundaries have, they argue, paid almost no attention to the role of 
organizational knowledge. Moreover, information and knowledge are at the heart of 
                                                 
7 Williamson somewhat undercut this observation by adding that ‘the tails of the distribution are thick’ 
(Williamson, 1985: 84). 
8 Williamson (2002) responds to Holmström and Roberts (1998). He endorses the general arguments 
they advance for taking a broader view of the firm and the determination of its boundaries. He also 
supports their plea for avoiding a narrow focus on the hold-up problem and the role of asset specificity, 
while defending asset specificity as an operational concept that ‘serves to breathe content into the idea 
of transactional ‘complexity’ (Williamson, 2002: 189). Our interest in these debates is in terms of their 
general endorsement of the importance of examining and conceptualizing organizational forms that are 
neither classical markets or hierarchies, rather than in terms of the extent to which either party 
adequately characterizes or addresses the attributes of ‘hybrids’. 
5
  
organizational design, because they lead to contractual and incentive problems that 
challenge both markets and firms. 
 
More recently, Roberts (2004) has argued in similar terms, describing the changes in 
the organization of the firm during the past two decades as comparable to the 
invention of the M-form structure early in the last century. The refocusing on core 
businesses and the outsourcing of many activities previously regarded as central has, 
Roberts argues, led to a shift in the nature of relationships between firms and their 
customers and suppliers, with simple arms length relationships being replaced by 
long-term partnerships. Layers of management have been eliminated, functional units 
have been dispersed to business units, and the authority and accountability of line 
managers has been increased. To facilitate coordination and learning in this novel 
organizational form, Roberts argues, firms have experimented with ways of linking 
people through horizontal rather than hierarchical communication. These 
organizational innovations, he suggests, are ongoing and offer the opportunity for 
improved economic performance. They alter the way work is done, and change 
people’s lives in fundamental ways. 
 
Legal theorists who have addressed the nature of the firm and its boundaries have 
confronted a similar set of issues, albeit in a distinctive manner. Not surprisingly, the 
issue of responsibility is a central preoccupation in the legal domain. For Collins 
(1990), the main issue is the principle of group responsibility under common law.9 
This entails the recognition of a legal person or entity as a representative of the group, 
with the group in turn being held liable potentially for the acts of its members. This is 
currently possible where the productive relations are controlled and directed within 
one capital unit, that is to say a firm in the legal form of a partnership or company. 
Collins argues that this principle of collective responsibility should be extended more 
widely, to take account of group responsibility across different capital units or firms. 
Collins refers here to what he terms ‘complex economic organisations’, that is a set of 
economic organizations that do not constitute a single firm or a single legal entity, yet 
none the less are integrated and may be treated as comprising a single set of 
productive relations. For instance, Collins argues that for the purposes of ascribing 
legal responsibility one might treat a set of subcontractors (for example in the 
construction industry, or car manufacturing) as a united group. Responsibility here, he 
argues, should be viewed as a matter of group rather than purely personal 
responsibility. While acknowledging the difficulties of re-conceptualizing general 
principles of legal responsibility, Collins argues for the importance of finding ways to 
identify integrated, yet legally separate, economic units for the purpose of attaching 
obligations. Teubner and Hutter (Teubner, 1993; Hutter and Teubner, 1993) have 
argued in similar terms, although couched more in the language of social systems 
theory. They start from the premise that hybrids are fundamentally different from 
market contract and hierarchical organization, by virtue of their coordination and 
control mechanisms. They are referring here to just-in-time organizations, franchising 
systems, money transfer networks and other networks in such sectors as energy, 
transportation and telecommunications. These concerns on the part of some legal 
theorists echo those of accounting researchers and practitioners. For in so far as all 
                                                 
9  See also Collins (2006) on the legal implications of the network architecture of supply chains.  See 
also Buxbaum (1993) who argues pithily and normatively that network is not a legal concept. 
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legal entity companies must prepare annual accounts, the legal entity principle 
strongly reinforces the accounting preoccupation with the bounded nature of the firm. 
 
Whereas accountants, economists and lawyers are relative newcomers to the debate 
about hybrids, management and organization researchers, together with sociologists, 
have long recognized and studied empirically the wide variety of organizational 
arrangements that structure and facilitate economic life.10 Over two decades ago, 
Ouchi (1979) considered the mechanisms through which organizations are managed, 
and used the label ‘clan’ to designate the informal social structures and processes that 
characterize some organizations. Although Ouchi’s concern was with intra-
organizational control mechanisms, his work none the less directed attention to a 
mode of control that did not readily fit into the traditional binary classification of 
markets and hierarchies. Rather than view the clan mode of control as an anomaly or 
epiphenomenon, he argued that it should be regarded as a subject of analysis in its 
own right. 
 
In the 1980s, a number of writers on management took these arguments a step further, 
and pointed to the changing nature of industrial economies and the increasing 
importance of cooperative organizational forms that do not fit the traditional antinomy 
of markets and hierarchies. Factors such as the increasing globalization of the world 
economy, shorter product life-cycles, the emergence of new hi-technology industries, 
the increasing customization of demand, the emergence of flexible specialization, and 
changing competitive conditions all helped create unprecedented demands on 
traditional modes of organizing production. The ‘quasi-firm’ was identified as a 
distinctive governance structure in the particular context of the construction industry 
(Eccles, 1981). This referred to an organizational form with characteristics of both 
markets and hierarchies, based on ‘relational contracting’ in which both parties can 
benefit from the somewhat idiosyncratic investment of learning to work together 
(Eccles, 1981: 340).11 In the very different context of academic publishing, hybrid 
forms of organization based on a dense network of personal ties were identified as 
critical to the fortunes of publishers (Coser et al., 1982; Powell, 1985). In the context 
of traditional ‘craft production’ in the German textile industry, a production system 
was observed and analysed that linked small and medium-sized firms in an extensive 
subcontracting system. Within it, key technologies were developed in collaboration, 
and in conjunction with overlapping inter-industry supplier networks (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984). And, in the context of the commercial aircraft industry, as well as in oil 
extraction, chemical and pharmaceutical research, microelectronics, tele-
communications, and biotechnology, management researchers provided increasing 
evidence of modes of organizing economic activity that did not fit the conventional 
categories of markets and hierarchies.12 
 
By the late 1980s, a substantial body of research on hybrid organizational 
arrangements already existed in the management literature. Powell (1987) reflected on 
this literature, asking whether hybrid organizational forms are a new and distinctive 
feature of the socio-economic landscape, or whether they are simply a transitional 
                                                 
10 Classification by discipline is always problematic, and particularly in this instance. The work of 
Oliver Williamson, for example, draws on and contributes to economics, organization theory and law. 
11 In this context, ‘somewhat idiosyncratic’ is distinguished, following Williamson, from ‘highly 
idiosyncratic’, with the latter likely to lead to full integration.  
12 See Powell (1987) for an overview of some of these studies. 
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development. He argued that analytical concepts such as markets and hierarchies may 
provide us with distorted lenses through which to analyse economic change. By 
viewing economic organization as a choice between markets and contractual relations 
on the one hand, and conscious planning within a firm on the other, Powell argued 
that we fail to see the rich variety that forms of cooperative arrangements can take.  
He spoke of a ‘stampede’ into various alliance-type combinations, linking large 
generalist firms and specialized entrepreneurial start-ups. Borys and Jemison (1989) 
addressed the specific issue of strategic alliances, defining hybrids as organizational 
arrangements that use resources and/or governance structures from more than one 
existing organization. According to this view, hybrids are still the product of 
sovereign organizations, yet they allow individual firms to draw upon the capabilities 
of multiple, independent organization, whether via mergers, acquisitions, joint 
ventures, license agreements or supplier arrangements. Granovetter (1985) went 
further, and suggested a more general argument concerning economic behaviour. He 
argued that all economic behaviour, whether it takes place within markets or 
hierarchies, is ‘embedded’ in interpersonal and social networks. Extensive and 
sustained subcontracting relationships based on interpersonal relations and shared 
norms, according to such a diagnosis, are not empirically intermediate organizational 
forms but indicative of the fundamental ‘embeddedness’ of economic transactions in 
social life (Granovetter, 1985).13 
 
In the 1990s, the management and organizational literature on hybrids burgeoned 
theoretically and empirically. There was increasing emphasis on networks, with 
Powell (1990) arguing now that the term hybrid was an inappropriate and inaccurate 
way of characterizing the diverse forms of collaboration that have existed 
historically.14  Rather than presuming markets as the starting point, and viewing other 
forms of exchange as arrayed on a continuum with hierarchies as the end point, 
Powell called for attention to be directed at networks as a distinctive mode of 
coordinating economic activity. In network forms of exchange, individuals engage in 
reciprocal and mutually supportive actions, and effectively forego the right to pursue 
their own interests at the expense of others. In the case of biotechnology, he 
suggested, sources of innovation do not reside exclusively within firms, but are 
commonly found in the interstices between firms, universities, research laboratories, 
suppliers and customers  (Powell et al., 1996). The general argument here is that, 
when knowledge is broadly distributed and brings a competitive advantage, 
innovation is likely to be located in a network of inter-organizational relationships. 
 
Others argued in similar terms, focusing on the social networks that enable and shape 
strategic alliances (Barley et al., 1992; Gulati, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Kogut et al., 1992; Nohria and Eccles, 1992). Noting the growth of 
interorganizational cooperation, and of interfirm strategic alliances, Gulati (1995a) 
argued that empirical studies in the transaction cost tradition have typically treated 
each alliance as independent, and considered the activities it includes as singularly 
reflecting only the transaction costs associated with it. This ignores the possibility of 
                                                 
13 On subsequent use of the notion of ‘structural embeddedness’, see for instance Simsek et. al. (2003) 
and Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001). 
14 See: Callon (1998) for a distinct approach to the construction of markets and the role of networks; 
Nohria (1992) for a review of the network perspective among scholars of management and 
organization; and Thompson et al. (1991) for a useful collection of material on markets, hierarchies and 
networks that spans a number of decades and disciplines.  
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repeated alliances that may alter the calculations of the partners when they are 
choosing contracts in alliances. The social context of alliances, according to this view, 
emerges over time and can only be observed by examining the relationships between 
firms across time (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Gulati et al., 2000). Uzzi (1997) argued in 
similar terms, although he drew upon the notion of ‘embeddedness’ and argued that a 
more precise formulation of the effect of social relations on economic action was 
needed. Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) argued for a focus on both the structure and 
process of ‘relational governance’, on the grounds that factors such as trust 
complement economic factors in the governance of exchange relations. Teece (1996) 
argued that hybrid organizational forms, such as inter-firm agreements linking firms 
with complementary capabilities and capacities, represent a significant organizational 
innovation.15 Teece et al. (1997)16 built on these proposals, and outlined the ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ approach that sought to explain how and why certain firms build 
competitive advantage in regimes of rapid change. Dynamic capabilities are defined 
here as the ability of a firm to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competence to address rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997: 516). Other 
key contributions to the strategic management field argued that competitive advantage 
may be based on a high degree of inter-firm specialization (Dyer, 1996). Or, more 
generally, a firm’s critical resources may extend beyond boundaries of the firm (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). 
 
By the end of the 1990s, and leaving aside differences of emphasis and terminology, 
as well as theoretical preferences for building on or superseding transaction cost 
modes of analysis, scholars in management and organizational analysis had 
accumulated a very substantial body of empirical research on hybrid organizational 
forms. Special issues of the Academy of Management Journal in 1995, the Academy 
of Management Review in 1998, and the Journal of Management Studies in the same 
year are testimony to the extent of the interest in these issues among management 
researchers. The volume and scope of this literature is quite remarkable, as is its 
continuing extension. Some writers have focused recently on the ‘processual’ aspects 
of inter-organizational relationships (Das and Teng, 1998, 2002; Zajac and Olsen, 
1993). Others have reaffirmed the importance of ‘trust’ (Adler, 2001; Carney, 1998).  
The issue of recurrent and relational contracting has been addressed further  (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992), as has the role of technological knowledge (Brusoni et al., 2001), 
the role of information practices (Sampler and Short, 1998), and the role of control 
mechanisms (Birnberg, 1998). The detailed structure of alliances has been examined 
(Sobrero and Schrader, 1998), the issue of cooperation has been considered (Smith et 
al., 1995), and the wide variety of coordination mechanisms has been emphasized 
(Grandori, 1997). Meanwhile, a range of hitherto neglected topics and issues have 
been shown to be worthy of attention. This includes the role of inter-organizational 
relations in the context of patient care (Gittell and Weiss, 2004), the role of 
institutions such as trade associations in shaping inter-organisational relations 
(Marchington and Vincent, 2004), and the issue of syndication in the venture capital 
industry (Wright and Lockett, 2003).17 Whether one uses the label ‘hybrids’, 
‘networks’, or simply ‘new organizational forms’, it is clear that the appetite of 
management and organizational scholars for researching and analysing this set of 
                                                 
15 See also Pisano et al. (1988) and Teece (1992). 
16 See also Araujo et. al. (2003), who more recently have proposed the notion of ‘indirect capabilities’. 
17 The implications of hybrids and network organizational forms for business history is also currently 
receiving renewed attention. See for instance Lamoureaux et al. (2004) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2004). 
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phenomena is undiminished even after more than a quarter of a century of intense 
activity.  
  
In a different context, and at the intersection of academic and political debate, the so-
called ‘third way’ political thinking also sought to pluralize organizational forms. 
Giddens (1998) depicted markets as merely one possible modality of governance. 
Much of the debate here centred on the quality of public services, and whether 
markets offered alternatives to state provision. The proponents of the third way 
argued that government should act in partnership with the agencies of civil society 
and business. Such arguments built on an earlier literature that represented the 
traditional antinomy between state and market as insufficiently complex for analytical 
and practical purposes (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). In addition to modes of 
organizing social and economic life through markets, states and communities, they 
proposed the notion of ‘associations’. The guiding principle of such organizational 
arrangements is ‘organizational concertation’ or negotiation within and among a 
limited and fixed set of interest organizations that recognize each other’s status and 
entitlements, and are capable of reaching and implementing relatively stable 
compromises in the pursuit of their interests. A decade or so later Hirst (1994) argued 
in similar terms, calling for ‘associationalism’ as a principle of administrative renewal 
in the face of bureaucratic failures. State provision, he contended, should be made 
more accountable to citizens, and market provision should be embedded  in a social 
network of coordinative and regulatory institutions. Market principles and 
mechanisms should be combined with non-market calculations and forms of resource 
allocation. Hybrid organizational forms, which are better able to manage uncertainty, 
once again appear to be the rule rather than the exception (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991). 
 
While organization theorists do not point to a single factor explaining the proliferation 
of hybrid organizational forms, one thing they are clear about is that there is no 
tendency for them to disappear or diminish in significance. Adaptability to changing 
market conditions, the limits of large-scale organization, access to specialist know-
how which is often located outside the boundaries of the large corporation, and 
generalized reciprocity and reputation are among the factors that have been identified 
as important in the growth of hybrid organizational forms. Most recently, innovative 
forms of organizing have been addressed from a broadened version of 
complementarities thinking in which complementarities are viewed as nets of inter-
relationships (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Pettigrew et al., 2003). Building on 
established traditions in organization theory, such as contingency theory and the 
notion of ‘fit’, complementarities thinking lends itself to explanations of inter-firm 
cooperation as much as to synergies among activities within firms (Miller and 
O’Leary, 2005a, 2005b). And in doing so it encourages researchers to extend their 
focus in two respects: firstly, to consider multilateral and complex interdependencies 
rather than unilateral or one-to-one issues of ‘fit’; secondly, to attend to innovations in 
process and systems, as well as in organization forms and structures (Pettigrew et al., 
2003). It is to these latter issues that we now turn in the following section. 
 
 
Hybrid Practices, Processes and Expertises 
 
A wide range of disciplines has thus acknowledged the existence of hybrids, and their 
importance to the socio-economic landscape. Yet, taken as a whole, the literature on 
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hybrids that has emerged across the past two decades or so suffers from two key 
limitations that are of particular relevance to the management of uncertainty and risk.  
Firstly, the literature on hybrids has been largely preoccupied with organizational 
forms despite recent suggestions to broaden the focus.  An unfortunate side-effect of 
this focus on organizational forms has been the relative neglect of the hybrid 
practices, processes and expertises that make possible lateral information flows and 
cooperation across the boundaries of organizations and firms. Information sharing 
across organizational boundaries, and the intrinsically hybrid nature of much of the 
information and expertise that facilitates it, have yet to receive the attention they 
merit. 
 
Accounting is central here, as are the interactions between accounting information and 
other types of expertise, whether in the form of engineering, marketing, design, 
medicine, etc. For, irrespective of the ongoing critique and self-critique of accounting 
as a limited mode of representation, the repeatedly hybridized calculative practices of 
accounting remain one of the most influential ways of rendering uncertainty and risk 
visible. We need to know more about the ways in which accounting interacts with, 
and at times hybridizes, as a result of encounters with other types of expertise. Even 
competing firms engage in continuous and frequent information exchange on a much 
larger scale than commonly acknowledged, and information transfers of varying types 
may work well without vertical integration. Much of this information is accounting-
based, albeit modified to deal with the often localized nature of the information 
transfers. Moreover, some firms see the opportunity to learn and share information 
effectively as the key to their competitive advantage. Yet, despite this increasing 
emphasis on information and knowledge transfer and sharing, there is little attention 
paid to the intrinsically hybrid nature of much of the practices, processes and 
expertises that play such a role. We argue for increasing attention to these 
mechanisms, as it is through them that uncertainty is actually managed rather than 
formally represented as manageable. We need to know more about the industry- and 
firm-specific practices that facilitate information flows and communication across the 
boundaries of firms, organizations and groups of experts or professionals. We need to 
know more about the varied and often localized metrics and languages that facilitate 
interactions that do not respect organizational boundaries, whether in the private or 
not-for-profit sector. We need to know more about the locales, institutions and 
conduits through which such metrics circulate, and in which they are embedded. And 
we need to pay attention to the multiple and diverse constituents of such practices, 
which often do not fit the neat categories according to which we typically order the 
world. 
 
Secondly, the literature on hybrids has been overly concerned with the question of 
whether hybrids are intermediate or transitional economic forms. Put differently, the 
debate continues to be suffused by a residual antinomy of markets and hierarchies, as 
if the loss or attenuation of such parsimony might lead to intellectual disarray. Those 
who emphasize the stability and diversity of hybrid organizational forms seem, 
however, to be willing to accept the empirical and theoretical challenge they present if 
we are to improve our understanding of organizational change. That is the approach 
favoured here. 
 
To illustrate the importance of hybrid processes, practices and expertises, and their 
significance for the management of risk, we offer a number of examples. Clearly 
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these can only be vignettes in the context of this essay. None the less, it is hoped that 
they indicate the range of issues that we argue need further attention when 
considering the ways in which cooperative action across boundaries is facilitated. For 
it is through such hybridized mechanisms that formally distinct bodies of experts, 
entities and endeavours are brought together to manage the primary risks that arise 
otherwise in the interstices between them. The examples are chosen to illustrate the 
different modalities of hybridization of accounting and financial expertise, and the 
implications for the management of risk. In the first example – of Moore’s Law and 
technology road-mapping in the microprocessor industry – we examine the 
hybridization of financial and technological expertise. In the second example – of 
investment ‘bundling’ at Caterpillar Inc. – we examine the hybridization of financial 
and engineering expertise. In the third example, we consider the hybridization of 
financial and medical expertise in the setting of health care reforms in Finland and the 
UK. 
 
Consider first the practice of ‘technology roadmapping’ as used to inform investment 
appraisal and coordination in the semiconductor industry (Miller and O’Leary, 2005a, 
2005b). Technology roadmapping refers to an information-sharing framework that 
operates internationally across very different kinds of organizations, including large-
scale semiconductor firms, suppliers, consortia, start-up firms, government agencies, 
and university laboratories. Roadmaps are used to form shared expectations across 
such diverse entities, for periods of 10 to 15 years ahead, as to when innovations by 
each of the entities must come to fruition, and how they should inter-operate, to 
enable the production of new and more powerful semiconductor and microprocessor 
devices. Technology roadmaps are information-sharing arrangements that are both 
hybrids themselves, and devices that help to create hybrid organizational forms. In the 
case of a microprocessor firm like Intel, roadmaps are crucial to the strategic 
investment decisions made at the most senior levels of the corporation (Miller and 
O’Leary, 2005a, 2005b). It is by means of roadmaps that the firm’s executives seek to 
coordinate their investments with those of a host of other firms and organizations 
world-wide, thus managing the risks of widely distributed sets of interrelated 
innovations. 
 
If technology roadmapping is critical to the lateral flow of information and the 
management of risks among firms manufacturing microprocessors, among sub-units 
of individual firms, and among complementors, then the so-called ‘Moore’s Law’ is 
perhaps one of the clearest examples of a hybrid practice that combines technological 
and financial components. Moore’s Law dates back to 1965, when Gordon Moore set 
out his predictions as to what would happen to the semiconductor components 
industry over the next ten years. On the basis of three data points, which he 
extrapolated from in a straight line for the next ten years, Moore predicted that the 
density of components on an integrated circuit would continue to double on an annual 
basis. These predictions were startling in themselves. Equally astounding were his 
predictions about the economic aspects of the future of integrated circuits. For the 
predicted improvements in speed and complexity, and the expected reductions in the 
size of integrated circuits, were seen to be matched by comparable reductions in cost. 
By 1975, these combined predictions of rapidly increasing complexity, with more or 
less equivalent reductions in cost, had come to be termed Moore’s Law and accepted 
as a fact across the industry. Since then, Moore’s Law has become not only a way of 
setting the pace of technological innovation, but also a way of defining the rules under 
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which competition occurs in the semiconductor industry. Only by constantly 
innovating technologically, it seems, could one achieve an apparently limitless 
reduction in cost per component. Moore’s Law is not only a hybrid practice at its 
core, combining as it does technological and financial projections. It also manages 
uncertainty in the most immediate and direct manner, by providing a set of shared 
expectations for all the firms and industries that are involved in the production and 
consumption of microprocessors. 
 
Consider another example that concerns investment evaluation and the coordination 
of a system of diverse assets. The practice in question is termed ‘investment 
bundling’, and was used by Caterpillar Inc. to frame their US$2.7 billion world-wide 
factory modernization project termed ‘Plant With a Future’ launched in the mid-1980s 
(Miller and O’Leary, 1994a). Investment bundles were defined as physical areas on 
the factory floor that had common elements relative to processing, material handling, 
tool management, systems and so forth. Investment bundling as a practice was itself a 
hybrid, formed out of engineering and financial expertise. The practice was developed 
as executives within Caterpillar Inc. borrowed practices termed ‘IDEF Zero’ from 
software design, and ideas of ‘group technology’ from mechanical engineering, to 
create novel ways of modelling and intervening upon investments in manufacturing 
(Miller and O’Leary, 1994b). The overall ‘Plant With a Future’ project world-wide 
was divided into 77 ‘bundles’. Plant operations were to be consolidated, simplified, 
automated and integrated via closely coordinated investment in new manufacturing 
technologies, new factory layouts and new information systems. 
 
For capital investment evaluation purposes, the most notable feature of the investment 
bundling process was that the focus was shifted from discrete stand-alone items to 
integrated ‘systems of assets’ that were viewed as synergistically related. Investment 
proposals and investment monitoring thus had not only to demonstrate a return on 
investment calculated in traditional accounting terms as an Internal Rate of Return.  
They had to show how product cost reductions computed in relation to competitor 
benchmarks, combined with process improvements such as assembly time reduction, 
work in process reduction in terms of numbers of physical units, space reduction 
framed in square feet, and reductions in unit travel distance, would result in overall 
desired rates of financial return. The so-called ‘bundle monitors’ were thus 
intrinsically hybrid calculative practices, for they brought together in a single format 
both financial and engineering metrics. And in doing so for a complex system of 
assets, rather than a stand-alone investment, they facilitated the management of the 
risks that could otherwise have arisen if one or more components of the overall 
system of assets had not performed as expected. 
 
Hybrids are also found in very different contexts. Consider for example one particular 
encounter between medical and financial expertise. The issue here centres on whether 
senior clinicians in a hospital setting, and in relation to the ‘New Public Management’ 
reforms, are willing to acquire financial expertise in areas such as budgeting, costing 
and pricing. In the UK, at least initially, medics seemed to wish to preserve intact the 
boundaries of the medical enclosure and thereby inhibit or prevent the forming of 
hybrids (Rose and Miller, 1992). In Finland, in contrast, senior clinicians seemed 
willing to acquire financial expertise and in the process to hybridize their existing 
skills (Kurunmäki, 2004). The process began in the late 1980s when medical 
professionals were made financially responsible through delegated budgets in the 
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localized settings of individual institutions. These initial experiments, in which 
consultants, physicians, nurses and administrative personnel participated, took place 
on a voluntary basis. Networks of calculation, in which medical experts were central, 
emerged gradually as key actors came to endorse the ideas, and the number of 
participants multiplied. Once budgeting skills had been acquired by medical experts, 
and the process embedded at ward level, it was only a relatively small step to make 
medical professionals responsible to municipalities and hospital management for 
keeping within their budgets. As the ideas of markets, customers and contracts 
became prevalent in Finland in the early 1990s, and with their recently acquired 
financial expertise, clinicians took readily to the detailed tasks of calculating costs, 
allocating overheads and constructing prices. Chief physicians spoke proudly of the 
price lists they had prepared, and the average costs they had calculated for different 
operations. They spoke equally proudly of the fact that they prepared costing and 
pricing information with no help at all from the finance unit in the hospital. The 
acquisition of financial expertise was considered to be relatively straightforward and 
unchallenging, when set alongside the acquisition of clinical skills and expertise.  
Calculative expertise thus became part of the repertoire of practices that medical 
professionals in Finland could deploy. Instead of inter-professional competition and 
jurisdictional disputes, a hybridization of expertise occurred. A new assemblage was 
formed among medical professionals, medical expertise, and the calculative practices 
of accounting. In terms of risk management, and whether deliberate or nor, this 
hybridization acted as a form of uncertainty reduction for the medical system in the 
context of the ‘New Public Management’ reforms. 
 
In the UK context, a further and related example illustrates how a range of groups can 
work across existing professional boundaries and thereby facilitate the emergence of a 
new set of hybrid processes and practices. The context is the ‘modernising 
government’ programme introduced in the late 1990s by the Labour government as an 
attempt to promote ‘partnership’ working among a range of service providers 
(Kurunmäki and Miller, 2004). Instead of coercion by the state or the untrammelled 
workings of the market, a generalized injunction to cooperate, and to enter into 
partnerships, was placed upon a range of agencies. The Health Act 1999 gave form to 
this incitation to cooperate, and brought health care and social services in particular 
into close contact. Following previous initiatives designed to encourage cross-sectoral 
working, the Health Act 1999 sought to weaken the power of existing professional 
and managerial enclosures by introducing a new duty of cooperation within the NHS, 
together with an extended duty of cooperation between NHS bodies and local 
authorities. A new statutory mechanism for strategic planning was introduced, with 
the aim of improving health care services, along with provision for NHS bodies and 
local authorities to make use of new operational flexibilities. These ‘flexibilities’ 
introduced in Section 31 of this Act – pooled budgets, lead commissioning and 
integrated service provision – provided further practices through which the 
modernizing government programme could be rendered operable. As one might 
expect, at a local level this programme encountered traditional and entrenched views 
that health care and social care professionals do not speak the same language, that one 
group is trying to take over the other, and that professional rivalries within health care 
make inter-organizational cooperation extremely difficult. But a kind of regulated 
hybridization, in the form of evolving cooperative forums to enable inter-professional 
and inter-organizational exchanges, also emerged. In one area, there developed ‘lead 
commissioning’ of continuing care placements, through which the social services 
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purchasing manager came to be responsible for commissioning all placements funded 
either by social services or health care, or jointly by these agencies.  In another area, a 
multi-agency team was formed to conduct joint assessments for nursing home care, 
made up of a consultant geriatrician, an occupational therapist, a community 
psychiatric nurse, a social service manager, a care manager, a community care 
manager and a district nurse. In both instances, the risk of individuals falling between 
the ‘gaps’ between different professional and administrative groups was seen to be 
reduced, although the longer term impact of formal ‘partnership working’ remains to 
be seen. 
 
These brief examples are intended to be no more than indicative of the range and 
multiplicity of hybrids that we argue need to be more fully recognized. We have 
deliberately taken examples from both the private and the public sector, for we do not 
consider hybridization to be confined to one or the other. We have suggested that 
hybridization can occur between the domains of science, technology and the 
economy, between the calculative practices of engineering and accounting, between 
medical and financial expertise, and between medical and social care agencies. In the 
case of the microprocessor industry, we have argued that Moore’s Law and 
technology roadmapping practices can reduce risk by coordinating and aligning 
expectations within and among firms. In the case of Caterpillar Inc., we have 
suggested that investment bundling can reduce risk by focusing attention on the set of 
assets whose successful integration can improve financial returns. In the context of 
the Finnish health care reforms, we have argued that the hybridization of financial and 
medical expertise can reduce risk by reducing uncertainty for the health care system 
as a whole. And in the UK health care reforms, we have suggested that formal 
partnership working can reduce systemic risks likely to arise through individuals 
falling through the ‘gaps’ between different professional and administrative groups.  
We do not conclude from these examples that hybridization is always benign, or that 
it always has positive effects for risk management. We do argue, however, that it 
demonstrates that there is much that falls outside the domain of formalized risk 
management, and that the hybrid nature of the processes, practices and expertises we 
have referred to is central to their ability to effect coordination across domains and 
boundaries. No doubt more examples are needed, and a more robust assessment of the 
factors that encourage or inhibit such developments. We need also to consider how 
and whether formalized risk management practices and regimes may inhibit such 
developments. And we need a better understanding of the interaction between 
localized practices that contribute to the management of risk, and the increasingly 
prevalent and formalized risk management and governance regimes. But we do 
believe that these examples are sufficient to indicate that researchers should consider 
a range of processes, practices and expertises that are currently confined to the 
penumbra of formalized risk management. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Hybridization is a continually inventive process, in which proliferation and 
multiplication is the norm. But if hybrids are where so much of the action is, and if so 
many social scientists from so many disciplines have emphasized their importance for 
two decades or more, why are they not given greater prominence in risk management?  
And why are hybrids particularly neglected in the public sector, as Hood and 
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Rothstein (2000) have observed? The answer, no doubt, resides in large part in the 
exacerbation of formal process, as Power (2004) has argued, and the regulatory 
pressures towards standardization that characterize much of risk management.  
Relatedly, risk regulation regimes may in part be a means for regulators, public bodies 
and government to manage the risks to themselves, rather than to manage the 
underlying risks. If one’s organization has in place the appropriate risk management 
committees, officers and practices, then at least there exists some ex post protection 
against possible accusations of recklessness or neglect. But it is undoubtedly also 
because hybrids are a challenge to risk management, for they typically reside beyond 
the boundaries of existing entities, and do not lend themselves readily to traditional 
ways of sorting the world. The types of risk and uncertainty management practices we 
have documented fall between the conventional professions of regulation such as 
accounting and law. And as topics of research, they also fall between the conventional 
academic disciplines of accounting, economics, law, organization theory and the 
sociology of the professions, which may in part explain their neglect by researchers.  
The attention paid in the literature to hybrid organizational forms supports this 
contention, as does inversely the relative neglect of hybrid processes, practices and 
expertises. 
 
We have drawn attention in this essay to the importance of hybrids in both the public 
and private sectors, and across the boundaries of these increasingly overlapping 
domains. In no way has our selection aspired to be comprehensive for either the areas 
or individual examples. But we do think they indicate the considerable variety and 
significance of hybrids. For instance, we have demonstrated the role played within 
Caterpillar Inc. of a firm-wide practice for evaluating and monitoring investments.  
This practice, termed investment bundling, blends together a range of engineering and 
financial metrics into something that fits neither the conventional categories of 
accounting nor the more recent notion of a balanced scorecard. Remaining with 
investment evaluation, but this time in the microprocessor industry, and with the focus 
on inter-firm as well as intra-firm practices, we have shown how technology 
roadmaps facilitate coordination across sub-units of the firm, as well as between the 
firm and its complementors. We have indicated how ‘Moore’s Law’, which pre-dates 
and broadly defines the contours that roadmaps have to follow, mediates between 
science and the economy, and defines the rules under which competition occurs in the 
microprocessor industry. 
 
In a very different context – an encounter between medical and financial expertise – 
we have shown the process of hybridization to be equally important. As hospital 
clinicians in Finland showed a willingness to acquire competence in budgeting, 
costing and pricing, and to attend associated training schemes designed specifically 
for medics, their skill-sets changed. In countries such as the UK at that time, and in 
contrast, the boundaries between medical and financial expertise within hospitals 
remained more clearly drawn. None the less, one can discern more recently evidence 
of a process of hybridization even in the UK, in the context of the ‘Modernising 
Government’ programme and the calls for formal ‘partnership working’. And the 
calculative practice called ‘Reference Costing’, together, with the ‘Payment  by 
Results’ programme, has resulted in hybrid practices being formed at a national level 
out of medical categories such as Healthcare Resource Groups and costing practices 
such as standard costing. 
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Clearly, these are no more than snapshots that illustrate the diverse nature of hybrids, 
although even these brief illustrations draw from a growing body of literature. These 
examples show, however, the importance of broadening the focus beyond hybrid 
organizational forms to consider also the wide range of hybrid processes, practices 
and expertises that create and enable lateral rather than vertical transfers of 
information and knowledge. For hybridization can occur whenever two or more 
elements normally found separately are combined to create something new. The 
formation of relatively stable organizational forms that do not fit readily the 
categories of market and hierarchy is only one example. Practices and processes such 
as investment bundling and technology roadmapping that draw on more than one type 
of expertise are another, whether these are formalized or not, and whether they are 
used for planning or monitoring purposes. The hybridizing of professional expertise is 
a further example, although the conditions for this to occur are probably more 
demanding in light of what may be perceived to be at stake in some contexts as a 
dilution of the self-image of a profession. And interdisciplinarity, an enduringly 
fashionable leitmotif for those who seek to design academic policy, is yet another, 
although it is a type of hybrid that is perhaps more frequently imagined than realized. 
 
The implications of hybrids for the accounting and risk management literature are 
considerable. We have argued that it is through hybrid practices, processes and 
expertise that the actual management of risk occurs, rather than through the 
formalized and obligatory routines of risk management. Even if this is currently more 
of an assertion than a rigorously documented fact, it is clear none the less that the 
management of uncertainty and risk happens in large part at the boundaries or 
margins of conventional entities and practices. It is clear also that accounting is being 
hybridized yet again in this process, and in diverse ways in different locales.  
Coordination across sub-units of a firm, cooperation and the sharing of expertise 
among firms, inter-professional knowledge transfer and even the emergence of new 
bodies of expertise, formal and informal cooperation across organizations and groups 
of experts, and the creation of metrics that draw upon different bodies of expertise are 
among the multiple dimensions of hybrids. These are only some of the examples of 
accounting and hybridization, and how it can have significant implications for the 
management of risk. The literature on accounting and risk management needs to 
acknowledge that the formalized hierarchical models that characterize much of the 
regulatory arena are at odds with the hybrids and the lateral relations that enable the 
management of organizations and the management of risk in all its forms to flourish.  
No doubt, to the extent that the practices we have described here come to be 
increasingly stabilized and taken for granted, they will appear less like hybrids. They 
may even come to be embedded in formalized risk management routines and thereby 
lose their ability to manage actual risks. But, as we have argued, such is the nature of 
hybridization. 
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